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Abstract—As cellular operators are suffering from a data
explosion problem, and users are consequently experiencing poor
data services, the introduction of femtocells offers a cost-effective
way to mitigate this problem. Femtocells enable larger network ca-
pacity by increasing spatial reuse of the spectrum and shortening
the distance to the users. Existing work has shown that open access
femtocells, which allow unregistered macro users to connect,
are efficient in reducing inter-cell interference and offloading
traffic. However, a major obstacle constraining the potential
capability of femtocells and open access is the lack of incentives
for privately-owned femtocells to serve unregistered users. Hence
in this paper, we propose a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction
based incentive framework for accessing such selfish femtocells.
We consider two scenarios: One scenario involves a single macro
user and another scenario has multiple macro users. We design
auction schemes for both scenarios and show analytically that
our schemes are truthful and have low computational complexity.
Extensive simulations validate these properties and show huge
performance improvement to the macro users.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent popularization and evolution of cellular networks
provide smartphone users with ubiquitous Internet connectiv-
ity. Most of the users’ data access activities, including web
surfing, multimedia streaming and online gaming, are being
“mobilized”. This creates explosive traffic demand for cellular
operators, which exceeds their network capacity, and hence
adversely affects the users’ experience [1]. To address this
issue, it is desirable if the cellular network capacity can be
increased, while a part of the traffic can be effectively offloaded.
The advent of femtocells [2] unveils a cost-effective way
to mitigate such a data capacity crisis. Using the home user’s
broadband service, a femtocell is a light-weight base station
overlaid on the existing cellular network, providing high-speed
data access over a short range. Femtocells increase the network
capacity by reducing the transmission distance and increasing
spatial reuse of the spectrum. In addition, it is widely acknowl-
edged that controlled open-access femtocells, which allow both
registered and unregistered users to access, can mitigate inter-
cell interference and achieve traffic offloading [3]. Note other
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offloading methods also exist, such as using WiFi hotspots [4]
and ad-hoc networks [5], [6].
However, the major obstacle lying between the potential
capabilities and the wide adoption of open-access femtocells
is the lack of incentives for these privately-owned femtocells
to allow access to unregistered users. Why would a femtocell
owner be willing to serve an unknown user who does not
contribute to paying for this resource? Our answer to this
question is to use market mechanisms to incentivize these
selfish femtocells to provide a service for monetary returns. An
auction [7] is one of the most popular trading forms as it allows
effective price discovery and efficient resource allocation.
In this paper, we consider the inherent selfish nature of the
femtocells and focus on engineering the incentives to promote
the femtocells to truthfully lease the access opportunity to the
macro user equipments (MUEs) by means of an auction. We use
MUE to denote the unregistered users close to the femtocells,
who desire larger data rate. Our framework guarantees the
femtocell owners earn enough compensation by providing data
service, and thus is a “win-win” solution to both parties.
Only a few recent papers address the incentive issues of
accessing femtocells [8], [9], but they consider different aspects
from those presented here. The authors in [8] design an auction
mechanism for femtocells to bid their area access permissions
to the wireless service providers. Our work focuses on the
trade in access time between femtocells and MUEs, and so is
fundamentally different. In [9], a refunding framework based on
a Stackelberg Game is proposed between MUEs and femtocells.
However, it is not a truthful mechanism so any agent is able
to cheat. By contrast, our framework guarantees truthfulness,
which enables the participating agents to faithfully reveal their
true valuations of the resource.
Specifically, we consider two typical scenarios with multiple
femtocells. In the scenario with a single MUE (SingleMUE
for short), the MUE can aggregate the throughput from neigh-
boring femtocells, and we design a multi-unit reverse auction
mechanism for femtocells to compete in selling their access
times. In the scenario with multiple MUEs (MultiMUE in
short), a multi-unit double auction mechanism is proposed to
find a best matching between MUEs and femtocells. None of
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these issues can be simply addressed by conventional auction
theories [7]. Inspired by VCG-auctions, in both scenarios, we
aim to maximize the system efficiency and show that this can be
achieved with polynomial-time complexity. It indicates that our
framework is both efficient and simple to implement. Moreover,
we rigorously proved the truthfulness of the mechanisms, which
effectively prevents market manipulation. Our scheme is also
individual rational. Extensive simulations, based on real urban
neighborhood topology, further show that the network perfor-
mance can be noticeably improved. Both MUEs and femtocells
achieve larger utilities by efficient resource allocation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the preliminaries of auction theory. In Section
III, we provide problem formulations of our framework, and
algorithms for their solution. Then we give proofs of some
properties. The performance evaluation is presented in Section
IV. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES ON AUCTION THEORY
In this section, we briefly overview the concept of auctions
and some relevant terms and notations.
In economics, an auction is a typical method to determine
the value of a commodity that has a variable price. Most
auctions are forward auctions which involves a single seller and
multiple buyers. In this paper, we use a reverse auction in the
SingleMUE scenario, which involve a single buyer (MUE) and
multiple sellers (femtocells). The sellers compete for selling the
commodities by submitting bids, then the buyer decides on its
purchase. In addition, we use a double auction in MultiMUE
scenario, where multiple buyers and sellers are included. They
submit bids and asks to the auctioneer, who decides the result.
The notation is introduced below.
bid (bi): the valuation of the resource submitted by bidder i,
which is not necessarily true. An ask (ai) of a seller in a double
auction is defined similarly.
Private Value (vi): the true valuation for the resource by bidder
i. This value is only known by the bidder.
Price (pi): the price actually paid by the buyer i (or paid to
the seller i).
Utility (ui): the residual value of the resource. For buyer i, it
is ui = vi − pi, while for seller i, it is ui = pi − vi.
Individual Rationality: An auction is individual rational if all
buyers and sellers are guaranteed to obtain non-negative utility.
It is a common requirement for auction designs.
Truthfulness: An auction is truthful if for every buyer/seller,
submitting bid bi = vi (or ask ai = vi) is a weakly dominant
strategy, which maximizes i’s utility regardless of the strategies
chosen by all other bidders. As the most critical property of
auction scheme, truthfulness prevents market manipulation by
revealing the true valuations of each participating agent and
facilitates resource allocation.
In this work, we aim to design auction mechanisms to maxi-
mize the system efficiency and having 1) individual rationality,
2) truthfulness and 3) polynomial-time computability.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we give the detailed formulation and analysis
of our auction incentive framework. For simplicity of presenta-
tion, we use access time as the basic commodity to trade. We
assume the system is time-slotted and the auction is performed
in rounds, with each round consisting of T slots.
A. Auction Mechanism Design for SingleMUE
The SingleMUE scenario involves one MUE and multiple
neighboring femtocells, as shown in Figure 1. This scenario
happens when the operator prefers to set up an auction for
each MUE. The femtocells are sellers selling the access time
units to the MUE, who can aggregate the data from multiple
femtocells to achieve a larger rate. We will design a multi-
unit reverse auction framework with each time slot as a unit.
The MUE is both the buyer and auctioneer, it receives the bids
submitted by the femtocells and determines the result.
Buyer: MUE
Seller: 
Femtocell
Access Time
Monetary Return $
0
Femto Utility U
1 2 3
v(1)
# Leased 
Time Slots
v(2)
v(3)
Utility Without Leasing
Fig. 1. SingleMUE: auction with one MUE and multiple femtocells.
We use I to represent the set of femtocells, and I = |I| the
total number. There is a limit on the maximum number of time
slots that can be leased out, set by the owner for each femtocell
i. We denote it as Ni. We further use Ri to represent the data
rate of the link between femtocell i and MUE. It is measured
by the MUE and does not change during an auction round.
In our framework, each femtocell i submits a bid vector:
bi = {(0, 0), (1, bi(1)), (2, bi(2)), . . . , (Ni, bi(Ni))}, (1)
to the MUE, where bi(n), 1 ≤ n ≤ Ni, is the bid for leasing
n time slots to the MUE. Additionally, as illustrated in the
right part of Figure 1, each femtocell i has a private value for
leasing n time slots out, vi(n), which should be its own utility
loss due to leasing. vi(n) may not necessarily be the same as
the bid bi(n). However in a truthful auction, it can be proved
that bidding the private value bi(n) = vi(n) is always a weakly
dominant strategy to the bidder. We will show this later.
Our auction mechanism design includes two parts, Winner
Determination and Pricing. In the winner determination (W-D)
part, the auctioneer, MUE, determines a set of femtocells as the
winners according to the bid vectors they submitted. Following
the VCG-based auction mechanisms, our winner determination
aims to maximize the system efficiency, formulated as:
max
ni
: U(
∑
i∈I
(
niRi
T
))−
∑
i∈I
bi(ni)− U(Rmac) (2)
subject to :
∑
i∈I
ni ≤ T, (3)
ni ≤ Ni, ∀i ∈ I. (4)
In the above formulation, U(·) is the utility of the MUE
as a function of its data rate. ni is the number of time slots
leased to the MUE from femtocell i. Rmac is MUE’s data
rate with the macro base station (BS). System efficiency is
represented by the difference of the utility gain achieved by
the MUE U(
∑
i∈I(niRi))−U(Rmac), and the summation of
the bids of all the sellers
∑
i∈I bi(ni), which is its typical
definition [7]. Constraints (3) and (4) limit the total leased time
to not exceed T and each ni to not exceed Ni.
We assume the MUE’s utility function U(·) is concave in
general, which reflects a wide rage of applications. For instance,
video quality follows a log-like function with the received video
rate. Therefore, for fixed Ri’s, U(
∑
i∈I(niRi)) is concave with
ni. In addition, in a truthful auction, bi(ni) = vi(ni), and
vi(ni) is a convex function of ni. To see this, consider there is
one (or several) registered femtocell user(s) (FUE) associated
with the femtocell i with data rate R′i and utility function U
′(·).
The private value of leasing ni units of time will then be:
vi(ni) = U
′(Ri)− U ′(R′i(T − ni)/T ). (5)
As we can see, increasing ni will reduce the utility of the
registered user and then increase vi(ni). It can be easily proved
that when U ′(·) is concave, vi(ni) is convex1. As a result, the
objective shown in Equation (2) is concave with respect to ni.
Conventional winner determination, in the form of integer
programming, results in high computational complexity and
leads to untruthful auctions [10]. However, when the objective
is concave, satisfying the “downward sloping property” [10],
we can solve the above optimization problem in polynomial
time. The procedures are given in Algorithm 1. It is a greedy
algorithm that maximizes the marginal utility gain (Lines 5
to 8) in each iteration. It has a computational complexity of
O(max{T,∑iNi}|I|) for each auction round.
Algorithm 1: W-D Algorithm for SingleMUE Auction
1 Ω← I;
2 ni ← 0,∀i ∈ Ω;
3 while Ω 6= ∅ and T 6= 0 do
4 foreach i ∈ Ω do
5 Ugaini ←
U(
∑
j∈I(njRj) + Ri)]− U(
∑
j∈I(njRj));
6 U lossi ←∑
j∈I,j 6=i bj(nj) + bi(ni + 1)−
∑
j∈I bj(nj);
7 ∆Ui ← Ugaini − U lossi ;
8 i∗ ← arg maxi∈Ω ∆Ui;
9 ni∗ ← ni∗ + 1;
10 if ni∗ == Ni then
11 Ω← Ω \ i∗;
12 T ← T − 1;
13 if U(
∑
i∈I(niRi)) < U(R
mac) then
14 ni ← 0, ∀i ∈ I;
Next we focus on the pricing part. We have the following
payment mechanism:
Definition 1: In SingleMUE auction, each winning femtocell
i receives a payment pi from the MUE as follows:
pi = bi(n
∗
i ) + (Q
∗ −Q∗−bi), (6)
1In fact, besides the shown example, any proportional fair scheduling of
FUEs and MUE makes vi(ni) similar to the form of (5), and is convex.
where Q∗ and Q∗−bi are the optimal solutions of winner
determination problem (2)-(4) with and without the bid vector
bi submitted by femtocell i. The utility achieved by it is
ui = pi − vi(n∗i ). (7)
Based on the above pricing rule, we then prove some
important properties of our auction.
Theorem 1: (Truthfulness) For each femtocell i, setting its
bid truthfully equal to its private valuation, bi = vi, is a weakly
dominant strategy.
Proof: To prove the truthfulness, we compare two cases.
One case is that the femtocell i bids its true valuation as bi =
vi. As shown from Equations (6) and (7), the resulting utility
is ui = Q∗ −Q∗−bi .
In the other case, the femtocell i bids a false valuation b′i 6=
vi, aiming to improve its utility by cheating. As a result, the
utility it can get becomes:
u′i = b
′
i(n
∗′
i ) + (Q
∗′ −Q∗′−b′i)− vi(n
∗′
i ), (8)
where Q∗′ and n∗′i are the corresponding optimal solution of the
bid vector set B′ = {b1,b2, . . . ,b′i, . . . ,bI}. Since Q∗−bi =
Q∗′−b′i , the loss of the utility can be computed as:
∆ui = ui − u′i = Q∗ − (Q∗′ + b′i(n∗′i )− vi(n∗′i ))
=
[
U(
∑
i∈I
(n∗iRi/T ))−
∑
i∈I
bi(n
∗
i )
]
−[U(∑
i∈I
(n∗′i Ri/T ))−
∑
j∈I,j 6=i
bj(n
∗′
j )− bi(n∗′i )
]
−b′i(n∗′i ) + vi(n∗′i )
=
[
U(
∑
i∈I
(n∗iRi/T ))−
∑
i∈I
bi(n
∗
i )
]
−[U(∑
i∈I
(n∗′i Ri/T ))−
∑
i∈I
bi(n
∗′
i )
]
(9)
As {n∗′i , i ∈ I} satisfies the constraints (3) and (4), it is
then a feasible solution to the original problem shown in (2).
Therefore, the optimal value achieved by {n∗′i } is always
inferior to that achieved by {n∗i }. Thus ∆ui = ui − u′i ≥ 0.
It indicates that when the bid vectors submitted by other
femtocells remain unchanged, femtocell i cannot unilaterally
increase its utility by submitting a bid vector b′i different from
its private value. Therefore, bidding vi is always a weakly
dominant strategy, and we complete our proof.
Theorem 2: (Individual Rationality) The utility gained for
each winning femtocell is a non-negative value.
Proof: As we have proved that our scheme is truthful,
bi(n
∗
i ) = vi(n
∗
i ),∀i, and the utility of a winning femtocell i
is ui = Q∗ − Q∗−bi . Note that Q∗−bi can be viewed as the
optimal solution when femtocell i submits the bid vector as
bi = {(0, 0), (1,∞), . . . , (Ni,∞)} and the bid vectors from
other femtocells remain unchanged. It is equivalent to fixing
ni = 0 in the solution. The resulting solution set with ni = 0
is a subset of the solution space to resolve Q∗. Therefore, the
value of Q∗−bi is always inferior to Q
∗, and ui ≥ 0.
B. Auction Mechanism Design for MutliMUE
Another scenario we consider, MultiMUE, involves multiple
MUEs and multiple femtocells coexisting in one area, as shown
in Figure 2. This happens when the operator prefers to set up
an auction covering multiple MUEs. Femtocells are still the
resource holders selling their access time slots to the MUEs.
The MUEs are buyers. We assume the macrocell covering the
area is the auctioneer, who receives the bids/asks from all the
agents and then performs winner determination and pricing.
This characterizes a scenario similar to the exchange market
and can be analyzed using multi-unit double auction.
Buyer: MUEsSeller: 
Femtocells
Access Time
Price paid to Auctioneer
Auctioneer: macro 
Base Station Price paid from Auctioneer
$
$
Fig. 2. MultiMUE: auction with multiple MUEs and femtocells.
We use I and J respectively to represent the set of MUEs
and femtocells. In a double auction, each MUE i ∈ I submits
a set of bid vectors {bij}, j ∈ J to the auctioneer, where
bij = {(0, 0), (1, bij(1)), (2, bij(2)), . . . , (T, bij(T ))}. (10)
Each term bij(k) stands for the bid for buying k time slots of
access time from femtocell j. As femtocells do not distinguish
users, each femtocell submits an ask vector
ai = {(0, 0), (1, ai(1)), (2, ai(2)), . . . , (Ni, ai(Ni))}, (11)
with ai(k) representing the ask for leasing k time units out. As
in Section III-A, we aim to find a truthful double auction mech-
anism that drives both the buyers and sellers to submit their bids
and asks equivalent to their private values. Specifically for each
MUE i ∈ I, the true valuation vbij(k) = U(kRij)−U(Rmaci ),
where Rij is the data rate for accessing femtocell j in a unit
time slot. For each femtocell j ∈ J , vsj (k) should be the utility
loss resulting from leasing k time slots.
To simplify the modeling, we restrict to the case that one
MUE can only buy time slots from one femtocell, and one
femtocell can only sell time slots to one MUE. We use nij to
denote the number of time slots bought from femtocell j to
MUE i. Then we can maximize the overall system efficiency
as follows:
max
nij
:
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
bij(nij)−
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
aj(nij) (12)
subject to : 0 ≤ nij ≤ Nj ,∀j ∈ J , (13)∑
i
nij = max
i
{nij},∀j ∈ J , (14)∑
j
nij = max
j
{nij},∀i ∈ I, (15)
where (12) follows the typical definition. Constraints (14)
and (15) reflect the one-to-one mapping relationship. In the
winner determination phase, we aim to solve the above problem
in polynomial time. Fortunately, problem (12)-(15) can be
converted into a max-weight bipartite matching problem.
m1 m2
n1 n2 n3 n4 nI
mJ Femtocells (Sellers)
MUEs 
(Buyers)
……
……
Fig. 3. Bipartite matching graph for femtocells and MUEs.
The bipartite graph is constructed as shown in Figure 3.
Each femtocell j ∈ J is represented as a vertex mj in
the upper part of the graph and each MUE i ∈ I is rep-
resented as a vertex ni in the lower part. The weight on
each edge connecting the femtocell i and MUE j is set to
wij = maxnij ,nij≤Nj (bij(nij) − aj(nij)). Once the bipartite
graph is formed, a matching that maximizes the sum weight
can be found using Hungarian algorithm [11], with complexity
O(I + J). We summarize the procedure in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: W-D Algorithm for MultiMUE Auction
1 Construct the bipartite graph;
2 wij ← maxnij ,nij≤Nj (bij(nij)− aj(nij));
3 Find the optimal matching Φ using Hungarian Method. Nodes
selected in Φ are the winners;
4 If i and j are a pair in Φ, i will lease
n∗ij = arg maxnij ,nij≤Nj (bij(nij)− aj(nij)) units from j;
Then we have the following pricing mechanism:
Definition 2: In our auction mechanism design, each win-
ning MUE i ∈ I pays the auctioneer:
pbi = bi,σ(i)(n
∗
i,σ(i))− (Q∗ −Q∗−bi) (16)
Each winning femtocell j ∈ J receives the payment from
auctioneer with:
psj = aσ(j),j(n
∗
σ(j),j) + (Q
∗ −Q∗−aj ) (17)
where σ(·) stands for the partner determined by W-D algorithm.
Other terms remain the same meaning as in (6).
Next, we prove the properties of our double auction mech-
anism. It has been proved that no double auction can achieve
efficiency, budget balance and truthfulness at the same time,
even putting individual rationality aside [12]. In MultiMUE, we
aim to have efficiency, truthfulness and individual rationality.
The macrocell BS, being the auctioneer, can tolerate a certain
level of budget unbalance as an incentive to motivate users for
traffic offloading. This concept has also been shown in [4],
[13]. Further, a reserve price Pres can be set by the auctioneer,
and when its profit is below Pres, it can terminate the auction.
Due to space limitation, we just show proofs for the MUE side.
The femtocell side are similar due to symmetry.
Theorem 3: (Truthfulness) For each MUE i, setting its bid
truthfully as its private value, is a weakly dominant strategy.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we compare
two cases. In case one, MUE i bids its private value bi = vi
and achieves the utility ubi = Q
∗ −Q∗−bi .
In case two, the MUE will bid a false valuation b′i 6= vi.
Then the utility it can get becomes:
ub′i = vi,σ(i)(n
∗′
i,σ(i))− b′i,σ(i)(n∗′i,σ(i)) + (Q∗′ −Q∗′−b′i) (18)
As the bid/ask vectors submitted by others remain un-
changed, we have Q∗′−b′i = Q
∗
−bi . The changes of the utility
can be computed as:
∆ubi = u
b
i − ub′i
= Q∗ − [(Q∗′ − b′i,σ(i)(n∗′i,σ(i)) + vi,σ(i)(n∗′i,σ(i))]
= Q∗ − [( ∑
j 6=i,j∈I
bj,σ(j)(n
∗′
j,σ(j)) + vi,σ(i)(n
∗′
i,σ(i))
−
∑
k∈J
ak(n
∗′
σ(k),k)
]
= Q∗ − [∑
j∈I
bj,σ(j)(n
∗′
j,σ(j))−
∑
k∈J
ak(n
∗′
σ(k),k)
]
. (19)
As the set of solutions {n∗′ij , i ∈ I} satisfies the con-
straints (13)-(15), it is then a feasible solution for the problem
shown in (12). Therefore, the value achieved by {n∗′ij , i ∈ I} is
always inferior to that achieved by the optimal solution of (12).
Therefore ∆ubi ≥ 0. It indicates that when the bid vectors
submitted by other MUEs and femtocells remain unchanged,
MUE i cannot unilaterally increase its utility by submitting a
bid vector different from its private value. Bidding vbi is always
a weakly dominant strategy.
Theorem 4: (Individual Rationality) The utility gained for
each winning MUE is a non-negative value.
Proof: As our double auction mechanism is truthful,
bi,σ(i)(n
∗
i,σ(i)) = vi,σ(i)(n
∗
i,σ(i)). The utility that MUE i
achieves is then:
ubi = vi,σ(i)(n
∗
i,σ(i))− pbi = Q∗ −Q∗−bi (20)
(20) has the same form as what is in the proofs for Theorem
2. With same steps, we know ubi ≥ 0 always holds.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present extensive experiments to evaluate
the performance of the auction schemes we proposed.
A. Experimental Setup
In our simulations, we consider a typical urban neighborhood
in Brooklyn, NY, USA, as shown in Figure 4. We pick one
road segment for simulation. The length of the road is 240m.
The apartments are squares, distributed along the two sides
of the road, of size 15m x 15m each. We use a parameter,
FemtoDensity, to denote the probability that an apartment has
a femtocell. Three FUEs exist in each apartment that has a
femtocell. Femtocells and FUEs are randomly placed in the
apartment. The macro BS is located at 300 meters north of the
center point of the figure, with 500 active macro users.
We follow the IEEE 802.16m evaluation methodology docu-
ment [14] for the channel model of macro BS↔MUE link. For
the femto↔UE links, the standard industry model for femtocell
evaluation [15] is used. For all the channels, the fast fading
component is modeled as Rayleigh fading with σ = 1. Shadow
fading is modeled as a log-normal random variable with a
240m
240m
15m ……
……
Fig. 4. Area map of a typical neighborhood in Brooklyn, NY.
TABLE I
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
BS Transmit Power 46 dBm
Noise power spectrum density N0 -174 dBm
Macro channel bandwidth 10 MHz
Macro BS antenna gain 7 dB
Femto BS Transmit Power 0 dBm
Femto channel bandwidth 5 MHz
Frequency reuse factor of femtocells 6
UE noise figure 4 dB
Wall loss 10 dB
Path loss (macrocell) Lmacro(d)dB = 17.39 + 3.76 log10 d
Path loss (femtocell) Lfemto(d)dB = 38.46 + 20 log10 d + 0.7d
standard deviation of 8 dB. The main system parameters and
path loss at distance d are summarized in Table I. We assume
the auction round T = 100 time slots. Sigmoid function is used
to represent the utility of each UE: U(R) = 1−e−a RRdem , where
a is the satisfactory factor fixed to 1, R is the received data rate
in the current round, and Rdem is the traffic demand. Rdem of
the MUEs are fixed to 4 Mb/s, while those of the FUEs are
uniformly distributed within the range [0, Rmaxdem ].
B. Truthfulness of the Auction Schemes
Here we validate the truthfulness of our proposed auction
schemes. For the SingleMUE scenario, we choose a reference
femtocell and compare the utilities it can get by bidding
truthfully b = v and untruthfully b′ = v · f , where f is a
scaling factor. Similarly for the MultiMUE scenario, we choose
a reference femtocell and an MUE, and manipulate their ask
and bid vector to a′ = v · f and b′ = v · f , respectively, in
two tests. FemtoDensity is set to 1 and Rmaxdem is set to 6 Mb/s.
The values of the utility loss ∆U = U −U ′ caused by bidding
untruthfully in 50 auction rounds are shown in Figure 5. It can
be seen from all three figures that when f = {0.5, 0.8, 1.5, 2},
∆U is always a non-negative value. Although we cannot test all
the sets of untruthful bids/asks, as they form an infinite space,
Figure 5 gives an indication that any agent cannot unilaterally
improve its utility by submitting fake bids/asks.
C. System Performance
Next we evaluate the system performance of the two sce-
narios under the influence of several key parameters. All the
points in the figures are the averages of 500 auction rounds.
First, for the SingleMUE scenario, we fix MaxDemand Rmaxdem
of the FUEs to 6 Mb/s and increase FemtoDensity from 0.1 to
1.0. We can see from Figure 6(a) that when the density of
femtocells is close to 0, system efficiency is also close to 0, as
few transactions happen. As the FemtoDensity increases, the
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Fig. 6. System performance: (a) the impact of femtocell density in SingleMUE. (b) the impact of number of MUEs in MultiMUE (c) the impact of maximum
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A femtocell in SingleMUE scenario; (b) A femtocell in MultiMUE scenario;
(c) An MUE in MultiMUE scenario.
average utility of the MUEs increases. This is because there
are more potential sellers providing better commodities. Our
auction scheme significantly improves the utility of the MUE,
by about 127% when FemtoDensity = 0.5 and 166% when
FemtoDensity = 0.8. Next, for MultiMUE scenario, Figure 6(b)
shows the impact of the number of MUEs. We can clearly see
from the figure that as the number of MUEs increases, the
average utility of MUEs drops. This is because the competition
among MUEs forces them to increase the price and lowers each
one’s share of the femtocells, which follows basic economic
principles. Also similar to Figure 6(a), the average utility of
the MUEs increases when FemtoDensity increases.
Next, we examine the impact of traffic demand Rdem of
FUEs. We fix FemtoDensit to 1 and adjust Rmaxdem in the range of
[1, 10] in the simulations. We deploy 10 MUEs in MultiMUE
scenario. As shown in Figure 6(c), in both SingleMUE and
MultiMUE scenarios, as Rmaxdem increases, the average utility of
the MUEs drops. The reason is that when the traffic demand
of FUEs gets higher, a femtocell’s private value on leasing
one unit access time will increase, resulting in higher price.
However, we can still see our framework leads to 150%
improvement even when Rmaxdem = 10 Mb/s, which is significant.
Note all the results are based on the truthfulness of the schemes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an incentive framework to mo-
tivate femtocells to open their access to unregistered MUEs,
which help increase network capacity and offload traffic. We
carefully designed the VCG-based auction mechanisms to allo-
cate access times and rigorously proved that all the participating
agents can truthfully cooperate. Simulation results demonstrate
that the performance of MUEs can be significantly improved,
with system efficiency maximized in auctions. In the future,
we plan to study the incentive issue of femtocells controlled
by different operators, as in [16].
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